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NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION

- I. You have before you a new CIA report on Soviet Civil Defense and

 Air-Raid Shelter Construction. This new report:
 - A. Has been concurred in by all members of the IAC.
- B. Reflects an extensive collection effort by all branches of the intelligence community which produced valuable new information.
- C. Generally confirms the conclusions I presented to you on January 15.

II. Difficulty of Observation

- A. It is impossible to determine the precise state of civil defense readiness in the USSR.
 - B. Mard facts difficult to collect.
 - C. Many Soviet civil defense activities under security wraps:
 - Number and strength of shelters, particularly heavy ones, concealed;
 - Existing shelters difficult to detect even by trained observers.
 Many identifying features hard to spot-hermetic scaling and ventilating equipment often installed after building completed.

III. Nature of Evidence

Nevertheless, we have considerable evidence on the Soviet shelter program.

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- A. More than 200 eyewitness reports from PW's, defectors, etc., who have observed or worked on civil defense shelters as late as 1957;
- B. All known official civil defense instructions advise population to use nearest shelter in event of air attack--none mention mass evacuation. For example:
 - 1. Soviet Training Manual for Local Anti-Air Defense (1957)
 says:

"At the signal 'Air Raid,' all residents must immediately go to the shelter or cover assigned to them."

2. A 1956 Soviet Red Cross publication says:

"The most important means of collective defense from all the dangerous factors of the atomic blast is the shelter which has been specially equipped for anti-atomic and anti-chemical defense. Shelters are generally constructed in the cellars of residential homes and industrial buildings ..."

- C. In the past two months, evidence that:
 - 1. Seviets continuing to install shelter doors in Mascow subway
 - 2. Heavy basement shelters installed in government buildings and railroad stations
 - 3. There is continuing construction of heavy shelter in Soviet economic enterprises

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attest to continuing civil defense training program. Most recent evidence includes:

- Official announcement on 12 February that 85.5 percent of the population had completed a civil defense "anti-atomic" training course and that two more advanced courses are scheduled for the entire population, to be completed in 1958 and 1960.
- 2. Reports of civil defense training activities in several Soviet factories and a number of city-wide blackout drills

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IV. Conclusions

Weighing all the available evidence, the conclusions of the intelligence community are that:

- A. No firm estimate on number of persons afforded shelter

 protection-believe a minimum of 10 to 15 millions of the urban population
 of 74 million are afforded varying degrees of protection-could run higher.

 (See paragraph ii of report.)
- B. Shelters which might survive suclear attack and remain airtight and equipped with adequate filtered ventilation would substantially reduce casualties from fall-out.

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- C. The Soviet shelter program is a sustained effort and will probably be continued in the future -- there is no evidence that its completion is geared to any future target date for the initiation of hostilities.
- V. The uncertainty surrounding many aspects of the Soviet shelter and civil defense programs is well recognized and the intelligence effort on this subject will continue to have high priority.

ORR/CIA 19 March 1953

